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The Social Security System has undergone an evolution in the last
decade, largely as a result of changes in the general environment in
which the system operates. One of these external changes was the
advent of substantially higher rates of general inflation during the
late 1960's and the 1970's. The system had been originally conceived,
and up until that time had operated, in an environment in which
inflation was either non—existent or was at fairly low levels for
almost all of the time. The rules governing the calculation of Social
Security benefits had been written without paying close attention to
the distinction between real and nominal quantities. With the coming
of higherinflationrates these rules caused the calculations of
benefitstobehave in ways that were different from what had been
originally intended. To remedy this situation, the Social Security
amendments passed in 1977 altered the method for calculating benefits
so that the calculations were done largely in real terms, making the
system less susceptible to wide variations in the general rate of
inflation.
A second major external change, which became increasingly apparent
during the late 1970's and early 1980's, was in the demographic
composition of the American population. This changehad major
iinpl ica tions for the financial viabi 1 ity of thesy stern overthelong
term.Up until that time, most recipients of SocialSecurity benefits
appearto have received substantially greater returns on their Social
Securitycontributions than they could have gotten in the private
markets, a situation which was made possible for a while by thelow—2
ratio of recipients to wage—earners contributing into the system. The
recent increase in the number of individuals in the older age brackets,
in combination with the gradually declining retirement age which
increases the proportion of those individuals drawing benefits and
reduces the proportion contributing to the system, has made it
impossible to mantain the high level of returns to recipients without
rather substantial increases in the taxes levied on the working
population. The Social Security amendments of 1983 have addressed this
problem by delaying by one—half year the indexing of benefits and by
moving the normal retirement age up to 67, both of which will have the
effect of reducing the general level of benefits. These amendments
also changed certain provisions of the Social Security rules which it
was felt discouraged individuals from continuing to work and thereby
continuing to contribute to the system.
In addition to responding to problems created by inflation and
demographic changes, the Social Security Amendments of 1977 and 1983
have also substantially changed the incentives for individuals to
continue working in later years rather than to retire. A number of
studies have analyzed the manner in which these incentives are affected
by such measures as the early retirement penalty, the delayed
retirement credit, the automatic benefit recomputation, the earnings
test, and benefits provided to wives and towidows.'
A moredif ficult issue arising from these amendments——an issue
Recentdiscussion of some of these incentives include Sammartino
(1982), Clark and Gohmann (1983), and Cordon (1983).-'3
that is the subject of this paper——is how the changing incentives have
affected the labor supply and retirement decisions of older
individuals. tn order to assess these effects, it isnecessary to have
some quantitative estimates of the relations shaping individual
retirement decisions.
The most common studies of retirement behavior are based on
reduced—form equations. These studies relate the retirement date to a
group of variables which describe the individual's characteristics and
the nature of the opportunities facing the individual. Unfortunately,
it is usually impossible to include enough explanatory variables in
such studies to enable them to trace through in any but the crudestway
the separate effects of the many actual and potential changes in Social
Security rules on retirement behavior.1 Estimates of structural
models, which are more difficult and less common than estimates of
reduced—form models, attempt to establish the nature of the underlying
preference structures which govern retirement decisions. Structural
estimates can conceptually be used to analyze the effects on retirement
behavior of almost any potential change in Social Security, but
previous estimates of structural models have employed simplifying
assumptions which have limited their usefulness for this kind of
In most cases, the only variables in the reduced—form models
which reflect the Social Security rules are a Social Security wealth
variable and the so—called Social Security delta (the change in Social
Seurity wealth associated with additional work effort). For a
discussionof the weaknesses in currently avai lable reduced—form
estimates of retirement equations, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1984).—4
analysis.' Accordingly, these models must be regarded as just the
beginning of our attempts to understand the manner in which Social
Security affects labor supply and retirement behavior.
The present work attempts to analyze the effects of several actual
and potential changes in Social Security rules using a recent improved
structural life—cycle retirement model which has been estimated and
described in Gustman and Steinmeier (1983a). The model allows
individuals to choose among full—time work, part—time work at a lower
hourly wage, and full retirement. Hours in part—timework are fully
variable within any one year, and the individual who chooses part—time
work can vary the number of hours from year to year. Theindividual
chooses when to leave full—time work, whether or not towork part—time
and if so, how much, and when to retire completely. Thesechoices are
assumed to be made so as to maximize lifetime utility subject to a
lifetime budget constraint. Such a model can consider the effectsof a
number of dimensions of Social Security, including changesin the
retirement age, the penalty for early retirement, the credit for
The pathbreaking work of Gordon and Blinder (1980) assumesthat
hours of work are continuously variable between zeroand full—time at a
constant wage, an assumption which is contradicted bythe observation
that many individuals quit a full—time job and take a partial
retirement job at a lower wage, even though they are not facing
mandatory retirement or strong incentive effectsdue to private
pensions. Mitchell and Fields (1983), at the other extreme,constrain
the choice to be between ful I—time work and complete retirement.
lurtIessand Moffitt (1983) model the decision toretireparlially, but
they assume that an individual who partiallyretires works the same
number of hours in each year thereafter as they do intheir first year
of partial retirement. For further discussions of the problemscreated
by the specifications adopted in these and otherstructural retirement
models, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1983a and1983b).—5
delayed retirement, the earnings test amount, the rateat which
benefits are reduced for earnings above the testamount, and the
general level of benefits. (Since our original model was estimated for
a population of white males who were not self—nployed, the analysis
contained here pertains only to thisgroup. We are currently
estimating a version of the model for a sample of nonwhite males.)
This paper is organized along the following lines.The next
section briefly outlines the life—cycle retirement modelused in the
study and indicates the parameters that are estimated for this model.
Section III presents the results of simulations for thismodel,
contrasting the effects of the 1972, 1977, and 1983 Social Security
amendments, and comparing these with the effects of a hypothetical set
of rules which would provide the same level of benefitsas the 1983
rules, but which would be actuarially neutral. The following section
analyzes the effects of the individual components of the ruleschanges
in the 1983 amendments and assesses which of thesecomponents are
likely to have important effects on retirement behavior. SectionV
considers how sensitive these results are to assumptions aboutthe
general inflation rate, the real wage levels, and potential reactions
of pension plans to changes in the Social Security rules.The
simulations in Section VI explore the effects of agroup of
hypothetical changes which could have been considered in lieu of the
changes which were actually passed in 1983. Section VII notes the
possibility of substantially better than fair actuarial returns to
wives under the 1983 rules and investigates whether thesereturns might
be exploited to encourage additional work effort by older individuals.A final section briefly summarizes the results and discusses some of
their implications and limitations.
II. A Life—Cycle Model of Retirement Behavior
The theoretical model used in this study is a variation on the
standard life—cycle model, altered to reflect important features of the
work choices actually facing older individuals. Earlier work (Gustman
and Steinmeier, 1983b) found that most individuals in their prime
working years reported that they could not cut their hours below full—
time in the jobs they currently held. Further investigation using
individuals from the Retirement History Survey established that there
was a significant wage drop among individuals who reportedthemselves
as not retired at all in one survey year and as partiallyretired in
the next survey two years later (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1982). The
wage drops were observed whether or not theindividuals changed jobs in
the process, although the drops were larger for individuals whodid
have to change jobs in order to retire partially.
These observations led us to postulate a model in which
individuals choose between two types of work. If an individual is
willing to work full—time in a job, he can obtain a higher wage thanhe
couldreceive for part—time work. In a sense, one of the compensations
for part—time work is the opportunity to choose the amount of work the
individual wishes to do rather than being constrained to work full—
time.In this setting, the individual chooses time paths for labor
supply and consumption so as to maximize the lifetime utilityfunction
given by-.7
U =fu[C(t), L(t),t] dt
subject tothe budget constraint
f e C(t) dt =+ Ie [woo +w(t)H(t)Jdt
whereCOt) is consumption at time t, LOt) is leisure at timet, r is
the real interest rate, and WF,W, HF, and H are the real wage rates
and labor supply to full—time and part—time work, respectively, with
the relation L(t) =1—
HF(t)
—FI(t).Otherconstraints in the model
limit the values of L(t) to range between 0 and 1 and require full—time
work if the individual receives WF(t).
The function g in the budget constraint relates the individual's
compensation, including the effects of Social Security——i.e., his net
compensation——to his compensation before Social Security. The function
g is illustrated in Figure 1. Between the origin and point A in the
figure, the individual's earnings are below theearningstest amount,
andthe Social Security rules do not affect the individual's level of—8
Figure 1.











compensation.' Between points A and B in thefigure, the income is
above the earnings test amount. An individual over the early
retirement age is subject to a benefit reduction for every dollar of
earnings above the test amount. For instance, under 1977 rules the
individual loses one dollar of benefits for every two dollars of
earnings above the limit. This loss in benefits is at least partly
offset by the fact that the individual's later benefits will be raised
as a result of forgoing present benefits, either by a reduced early
retirement penalty or an increased delayed retirement bonus. The slope
of the function between A arid B reflects the net result of the lost
current benefits and the increased future benefits. Above point B, the
individual has exhausted his benefits, and further earnings are not
subject to the effects of a benefit reduction. In this range, the
individual may again keep all of any incremental earnings. Above point
C in the diagram, another consideration comes into play.In this
range, the individual has reached an earnings level high enough that he
is substituting current earnings for a previous year's earnings in the
calculationof the average monthly earnings and the primary insurance
1In drawing the function without a vertical intercept, the
diagramimplicitly attributes any Social Security benefits for which
the individual may currently be eligible to the decisions made in
previous years. Symmetrically, a choice to be above point A in the
diagram will affect benefits in future years, but these changes are
attributed to current compensation. For the current period labor
supply decision, however, it makes no difference whether or not a
vertical intercept is included, since in a diagram o. current period
income versus current period labor supply, the indifference curves are
vertical displacements of each other, with the implication that a
vertical displacement of the current period budget constraint will not
affect the amount of labor supplied. For a proof of this proposition,
see Gustrnan and Steinmeier (1983c).-.10
amount. (Actually, point C might occur to the left of point B, a
possibility we do not illustrate, but do considerin our simulations.)
The individual finds that above point C, not only does he get to keep
an additional dollar of earnings, but also the earningsproduce later
benefits in the form of increased future Social Security benefits.The
slope of the function in this range reflects botheffects and is
greater than unity.
The utility function used in the empirical work is of the
following CES specification:
X+6
u[C(t), L(t), t]=sign()<[C(t)]+e [L(t)] )
where is a vector of explanatory variables which affect therelative
weight of leisure in the utility function attime t, B is the
associated vector of parameters which is presumed to be constant across
both time and individuals,is a time—invariant stochastic term
affecting the relative weight of leisure for the individual,and ó
(with < 1) is a time—invariant stochastic term definingthe curvature
of the indifference curves. In this specification,which follows that
used by Gordon and Blinder, the within—period elasticityof
substitution is calculated as C=11(1—6).
The j);lralneters for the model are the elements ofi(includinga
cons tant and coef fici cots for age ,healthsti tus and vintage) and
parameters characterizing the distributionsof the stochastic terms.
These parameters have been estimated by a maximumlikelihood estimation
procedurewhich is discussed in Appendix A.That appendix, which is-ii
available on request, also discusses the specification for the
distribution of the stochastic terms and presents the estimated
parameter values.
III. The Evolution of Social Security Rules and Their
Effects on Retirement Behavior, 1972—1983
Using estimates of the model just discussed, this section
investigates the effects of various changes in the Social Security
rules from 1972 to the present. These include the major revisions
introduced into the system by the 1977 amendments and the more recent
revisions legislated this year (1983). Since it is generally felt that
the most recent revisions go a long way toward making the system
actuarially fair, this section also investigates the hypothetical
effects which would occur if the remaining traces of actuarial bias
were removed from the system.
The simulation procedure employed to obtain the results in this
and subsequent sections is described in detail in Appendix A, which, as
noted, will be made available upon request. The simulations are
intended not so much to reflect the effects of the system on the
cohorts receiving Social Security today, or in past years, as to
indicate the long—term effects of changes in the system on a
hypothetical cohort which is held constant across the v;irioussetsof
rules considered. The most important consequences of this outlook are
that the average monthly earnings are calculated with 35 years of
earnings and that no maximum is applied to the earnings, which
implicitly assumes that any maximum is high enough so that it does not—12
affect a large number of individuals. The simulations thus exclude two
different transitory effects which arose during the 1950's and 1960's——
the first arising because the average monthly earnings calculationsin
those years included a relatively low number of years, and thesecond
because in several years during that period the maximum creditable
earnings were low enough to affect a significant number of workers.
For the simulations, the manner in which Social Security rules
influence work incentives includes the effects operating through the
individual's own benefits and, if he is married, through his wife's
benefits and any potential widow's benefits for which she may
eventually be eligible. Where appropriate, benefits arereduced if the
individual begins to collect the benefits before the normal retirement
age and increased if the individual works beyondthe normal retirement
age and has earnings above the earningstest amount. In some cases an
individual will find that it is actuarially advantageous to postpone
collecting benefits even though he or she is eligible to do so.
Individuals are assumed to postpone collecting benefits under such
circumstances. The consequences of this possibility are discussedin
more detail in Section VII.
In discussing how the different sets of Social Securityrules
affect retirement behavior, it will be helpful in the presentationto
pick one set of rules as a base case and to comparethe effects of the
other sets of rules to it.Since later sections will focus on the
effects of the 1983 rules relative to the 1977 rules, theresults for
the 1977 rules will prove to be a convenient choice for abase. Figure
2 provides a general overview of theretirementbehavior which arises-— -SimulatedPetirement Decisions of Older Workers UndeIL














61 63 67 65
Age
69-14
inthe simulations with the 1977 Social Securityrules.' The most
noticeable aspect of the table is the dramatic decline in the number of
individuals who continue to work during the period between age 61 and
age 69, with almost three—quarters of theindividuals working at the
earlier age and fewer than one—sixth of the individuals working at the
later age. The percentage of individuals who are working part—timeis
in the 7—8 percent rate up until age 64 and rises to the 10—12 percent
range for the three—year span between 65and 67. Between 64 and 65 the
decline in the percentage of individuals who continue working is
relatively steeper; this corresponds to the well—documented peakof
retirement activity at age 65, which is the normal retirement age for
Social Security as well as for many private pension plans.
Figure 3 illustrates the simulated effects of three setsof Social
Security rules on retirement activity relative to thatwhich would have
occurred with the 1977 rules. The alternating dashed and dotted
lines refer to the 1972 rules, the dashed line to the 1983 rules,and
the solid line to a set of rules similar to the 1983 rulesbut omitting
the earnings test. The three panels in the figure indicate theeffects
of the various sets of rules on the percentage of individuals working
full—time, working part—time, and fully retired, respectively.The
values in the figure refer to the deviation in the percentageof
individuals in the particular retirement state from the percentagethat
would have occurred with the 1977 rules. To illustrate, thedashed
This and subsequent figures are based on Appendix Tables B.l—
B.7, which present numerical results for all thesimulations and are
also available upon request.15
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line in the upper panel of the figure reaches a value of 5.8 percent at
age 65, meaning that under the 1983 rules,the percentage of
individuals working full—time will be 5.8 percentage points higherthan
under the 1977 rules. From Figure 2 it can be seen that24.3 percent
of the individuals would be working full—time under the 1977rules.
Thus by implication, 30.1 percent would be workingfull—time under the
1983 rules.
Figure 4 presents the information in a mannerwhich emphasizes the
number of individuals who retire at different ages. Thesevalues are
calculated as the difference between the percentage ofindividuals who
are retired at a particular age and the percentagewho were retired one
year previously. For example, from Figure2, 40.7 percent of the
individuals are working full—time at age 64 and 24.3 percent are
working full—time at age 65. The difference of16.4 percent represents
the percentage of individuals who retire fromfull—time work at age 65.
That value is plotted in Figure 4 along the dottedline (representing
the 1977 Social Security rules) at age 65.
The major labor supply effects of the evolution ofSocial Security
rules over the period can be characterized fairly easily. Comparedto
the 1972 rules, the introduction of the 1977 rules appearsto have
generally decreased the percentage ofindividuals working full—time and
increased the percent;lge ret i red between 61 mid 69. Theyhid
relativelylittle effect on the distribution of ages at which
individualsleft full—time jobs or left work altogether in this age
range,however, andin particular they had noeffectin reducing the









































1983rules, when they take full effect, should have a fairly small
impact on the number of people working full—time or the numberretired
before age 65, but at age 65 and thereafter the percentage of
individuals working full—time will be noticeably increased and the
percentages working part—time or retired willboth decline. This is
reflected in Figure 4 as a dramatic decline in the peak of retirement
activity at age 65, both for individuals retiring fromfull—time jobs
and individuals retiring from work altogether. As shown by thesolid
lines in the two figures, the 1983 rules have an impact that is close
to the impact that would be observed if the rules were actuarially
fair, in the sense that the earnings test were entirelyeliminated.
That is, if individuals were allowed to accept Social Security payments
regardless of whe.ther or not they were working, therewould be
relatively little change from the retirement behavior underthe 1983
rules.
The general decline in retirement ages brought about by the 1977
rules appears to have been caused by changes in the mannerin which
averagemonthly earnings (ANE) and the primary insurance amount(PtA)
were calculated. Up until 1977, the PiNEcalculationshad been done
strictlyin nominal terms. With the introduction of the 1977 rules,
however, all earnings before the age of 60 were adjusted upto that age
by an index of average monthly earnings, while earningsafter that age
continued tobe entered in the ave rage in nom i tmIte ntis.Thi s index ing
of the earnings calculation had the effect of increasing thevalue of
ANE, with two consequences. First, the indexingof the earnings
figures for earlier years would have made it less likelythat current—19
earnings would displace an earlier year from the calculations, and if
it did, the substitution would have increased th average less than
without indexing. Secondly, the higher average would have placed the
individual in higher brackets in the PIA formula for which the marginal
impact of a given increase in AME would have been less than before.
Thus, under the 1977 amendments, the combination of a smaller increase
in AME coupled with a smaller marginal impact on PIA lessened the
amount by which current work would increase future benefits through the
AME and hence would have lowered the incentives for continued work.
This effect was reinforced by the fact that the marginal effect of AME
on PIA in the highest bracket fell from 20 percent under the 1972 rules
to 15 percent under the 1977 rules.
Countering this encouragement toward earlier retirement, but not
to a very great degree, were 1977 rules changes in the penalties for
retiring before age 65 and in the credits for retiring after age 65,
which had the effect of encouraging later retirement throughout the age
range. For retirement after 65, the 1977 rules introduced a 3 percent
increase in future benefits for each year after 65 that an individual
did not collect benefits. This had the effect of reducing the size of
thepenalty for working later and encouraging a later retirement than
otherwise. For retirement before 65, the 1977 rules started to index
the value ofanypenaltyforearlyretirement,avaluewhich under the
previous ruleshad not been indexed. This had the effect of increasing
the real value of any penalty for early retirement and hence of
encouraging later retirement. The magnitude of this effect, as brought
Outin the debate between Burkhauser and Turner (1981) and Blinder,-2 0
Gordonand Wise (1981), depends on the inflation rate and its
associated nominal discount rate. The simulations here are performed
under the assumption of a relatively moderate inflation rate (the
averagerate over the 1947—1982 period), and hence the indexing of the
early retirement penalty only moderately encouraged later retirement.
In any case, the 1977 changes in the early retirement penalties and the
delayed retirement credit were swamped by the changes in the method of
calculating the AME and the PIA, both in terms of their effects of the
work incentives provided to the individuals in the sample and in terms
of the response of the individuals to these changed incentives.
In comparison to the 1977 rules, the 1983 rules recently enacted
can be expected to have relatively little impact on individualsunder
age 65, but a much sharperimpact thereafter. Between the ages of 65
and 68, the new rules should ultimately cause the number of individuals
working full—time to be 4 to 6 percentage points higher than theywould
otherwise be. These increases are coming on top of a relatively small
base of individuals still working in this age range, so in percentage
terms the increases in full—time work appear to be fairlysubstantial.
For example, the increase of 4.3 percentage points in the numberof
66—year—olds working full—time represnts an increase from18.4 percent
to 22.7 percent of the 67—year—olds who are working. [n other words,
the number of 66—year—olds who are working full—time will increase by
about one—quarter, with similar if not larger figures applying to the
other age categories above age 65. Looking at the result in terms of
the number of individuals retiring at different ages, the 1983 rules
should cause the peak in retirement from full—time work at age 65 to-21
fall by more than one—third, from 16.4percent to 10.1 percent.
Although a detailed examination of the individualcomponents of
the 1983 changes will be postponed until the next section, the
principal element responsible for this increase in post—65—year—olds
still working full—time is not hard to spot——namely, the increase in
the delayed retirement credit from 3 percent to 8percent. This
figure, which also applies to any widow's benefits for which the
individual's spouse may ultimately be eligible, causes the Social
Security system to be about actuarially fair until the late sixties or
early seventies. The only individual for whom the system is not fair
in this age range is an individual who has aspouse over 67.In this
case, if an individual works enough to cause benefits to be lost to the
earnings test, the spouse will lose benefits also, and in the Social
Security rules there is no provision for a spouse over this age to
recover any lost benefits through increases in later benefits. Even in
this case, however, the system will not be seriously unfair. For
reasons discussed in Section VII, the 1983 rules will foster, for
almost everyone over 65, a considerably greater degree ofencouragement
for full—time work.
To investigate further the proposition that the 1983 rules had
taken the Social Security system most of the distance toward actuarial
neutrality, we turn to the results of a simulation which was done using
the 1983 rules, but eliminating the earnings test. With no earnings
test, the early retirement penalties and the delayed retirement
credits, along with their associated actuarial biases, become-'22
irrelevant for the work decision because the work decision and the
decision as to whether or not to accept Social Security benefitsbecome
two separate issues. The results, as illustratedin Figures 3 and 4,
indicate that the removal of the last traces of actuarialinfluence on
the work decisions causes some further increase infull—time work, as
might be expected, but the increase is fairlyminor in comparison with
the changes resulting from the 1977 and 1983 rules changes.The clear
implication is that there is very little further potentialfor
increases in full—time work effort induced by additional changesin the
Social Security system, removing the last traces of theeffects of
actuarial bias on work effort.
IV. Effects of the Separate Components of the1983 Changes
The new 1983 legislation changed a number ofelements of the
Social Security system. The major provisions of the legislationwhich
are investigated in this paper include:(a) the eventual increase in
the age of normal retirement to 67, with theassociated increase in the
penalty for retirement at 62 to 30 percent,(b) the eventual increase
in the delayed retirement credit to 8 percent per yearfor benefits
that are lost after the normal retirement age,(c) the reduction in the
rate at which benefits are lowered for earningsover the test amount to
one dollar of benefits foregone for everythree dollars in earnings
over the test amount (this provision appliesonly to individuals over
the normal retirement age), and (d) the delay bysix months in the-P23
inflationadjustment to benefit levels.1 The effects of the first
three of these provisions are illustrated in figures 5 and 6, which are
analogous to Figures 3 and 4 presented earlier. The effects of the
delay in the inflation adjustment were very small, never exceeding two—
or three—tenths of a percentage point. In order to avoid further
cluttering in the graphs, the results of this change were included.
Both the increase in the retirement age and the increase in the
delayedretirement credit reduce the peak in retirement at age 65 and
increase the number of individuals who are working full—time at 65 and
66,largely because both of these measures bring the Social Security
system much closer to actuarially fair at these ages. The effects of
the two measures are different for individuals 67 and over, however.
For the increase in the delayed retirement credit, individuals over 67
Another provision of the recently passed amendments, thetaxa-
tion of half of the benefits if total income exceedsa given income
level, could not be simulated very well within the context of the
present model. The given income level is high enough so that very few
individuals in the sample would be affected on the basis of labor earn-
ings alone,and the model is probably not very robust in terms of simu-
lating non—labor income. For further discussion on this last point,
see Gustman andSteinmeier (l983a).tsar,'. I,, tI,i I,n Ii
:Figure5.
Effects ofthe Separate 1983 Rules Changes on the
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at 62.,26
will continue to work full—time more than they otherwise would. An
increase in the normal retirement age to 67, on the other hand, will
cause a new peak of retirement to occur at that age, but work activity
after this age will be little affected. It is evident from comparing
the effects of the individual components to the overall effects of the
1983 changes that the dominant effect arises from the increase in the
delayed retirement credit. The reason for this result is fairlyclear:
if the delayed retirement bonus rate is increased to a level comparable
to the early retirement penalty rate, it makes relativelylittle
difference what age is formally designated as the normal retirement
age, since the incentive effects on eitherside of that age are
approximately the same.
The reduction in the rate at which benefits are lowered to one
dollar for every three dollars in earnings over the test amount serves
to dilute the actuarial penalties per hour worked foradditional work.
For instance, if the effect of the delayed retirementcredit were to
raise future benefits by forty cents for each dollar of benefits lost
tothe earnings test,and if the wage were$10 per hour,then the
actuarialpenalty per hour of additional work would be $3 (calculated
as$10 times 0.5 times the 0.6 penalty rate) with a one dollar for
everytwo dollars reduction rate, but only two dollarswith a one
dollar for every three dollarsreduction rate. This change has the
same general effects as the combined changes (which areapproximately
actuarially neutral), both in terms of the reduction in the peakof
retirementactivity at 65 and the increase in full—time work
thereafter. But the magnitude of the effects from thischange alone is27
less than half the magnitude of the effect of the combined changes.
As for the delay in the inflation adjustment, an important reason
why this provision has so little effect on retirement and work activity
is that under moderate inflation assumptions, benefits are affected by
only a relatively small amount. Furthermore, this measure is
essentially a uniform reduction in benefit levels. Hence, there are no
strong intertemporal labor substitution effects which would shift the
peaks and valleys in retirement activity.
V. Sensitivity of the Findings
Threeadditional sets of simulations were undertaken to assess how
sensitive the comparison between the effects of the 1977 rules and the
1983rules is to various assumptions about the environment in which the
comparisonismade. Figure 7illustratesthe results of these
simulations.For reference, the solid lines in the figure indicate the
previous results. The aim of this section is to determine how much any
changesin assumptions will cause the results to deviate from these
lines.
Thefirst set of simulations makes the comparison between the two
sets of rules using an inflation rate that is 5 percentage points
higher than the inflation rate used in the previous simulations. A
second pair of simulations investigates how the results might be
different for an individual whose wage rates, pension benefits, and
other real quantities were adjusted upward to levels that might pertain
to individuals who would be age 65 in the year 2000. Neither of these
changes in assumptions appears to have a very significant impact on the-P28
measuredeffects of the 1983 changes in the Social Security rules. The
most noticeable difference is that under either change, slightlyfewer
people would be working full—time and slightly morewould be working
part—time betwen the ages of 65 and 68. Thesedeviations are very
small in comparison with the overall effects of the 1983rules changes,
however. Accordingly, it would appear that the results reportedin the
previous sections are fairly robust with respect tothese kinds of
changes in assumptions.
A third set of results in Figure 7 seeks to establishhow the
comparison between the 1977 and 1983 rules would beaffected if private
pension plans change their normal retirement ages tomatch the changes
in the Social Security normal retirement age. More specifically,the
dashed lines in the figure make the assumption thatif a pension plan
had previously specified age 65 as the normal retirement age,that age
will be increased to 67 when the 1983 Social Securityrules take
effect.1 This change in assumptions does make a noticeable difference,
increasing full—time work at ages 65 and 66 by 3 to4 percentage points
in comparison to the previous results. This would serve toshift the
remaining peak in retirement activity at age 65, asillustrated in
Figure 4, to age 67. As the bottom two panelsin Figure 7 show, the
increase in full—time work would come partly at the expenseof part—
time work and partly at the, expense of full retirement.
1We are aware that pensionplans maybe changed to offset rather
thanto augnient the inccnL ives created by changesin Sc i a I Seciir i ty.
Such changes are one implication of the literaturewhich relates pen-
sion plan provisions to the goal of designingahor market contracts so
as to raise labor productivity overthe life cycle. See, for example,
Lazear(1982) and Blinder(1982). Thisliteraturesuggests thatthe
net effect of changes in the provisionSof Social Security legislation
will be weaker than those indicated in our analysis.29
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plans matching -the increase- -J in normal retirement age.•3O
VI.Alternative Potential Changes in the Benefit Structure
This section investigates the effects of several alternative
changes to the Social Security rules which might have been made instead
of or in addition to those that were actually adopted in 1983. Figure
8 illustrates the results of the simulations undertaken for this
purpose. The base of comparison is, as in the other figures presented
above, the set of rules under the 1977 amendments. It is evident from
only a quick glance at the figure that none of the changes explored in
this section has a very large effect on retirement and labor supply
behaviorin comparison with the changes examined in previous sections.
The changes illustrated in Figure 8 are as follows: (1) In the
firstsimulation, the penalty for early retirement at age 62 is
increased to 30 percent, holding the other rules of the system to the
1977 set of rules. This change seems to have so little effect largely
because the early retirement penalty rate under the 1977 law was
already approximately actuarially fair, and with the increased penalty,
individuals would simply evade a more than fair actuarial reduction by
delaying registration for benefits. (2) The second simulation
investigates the effects of eliminating early retirement completely.
Since the actuarial adjustment between the early and normal retirement




Increasepenalty for early retirement to
early ret irement.
——' Allowearly retirement at age 60 with
I 'Impose•30tax On one—half of-benefits.








. . . .
H


















































would apparently have had little effect on laborsupply.1 (3) The
third simulation allows individuals to begin collecting benefitsat age
60, with the early retirement penalty rate remaining at6 2/3 percent
per year. Because individuals consideringretiring at age 60 or 61
would have to give up relatively fewer benefits (they wouldbe eligible
to collect only 66 2/3 percent and 73 1/2 percentof the PIA's,
respectively) in order to secure an increase of 6 2/3 percentof the PIA
in all of their future benefits, postponing the benefitswould be more
The increase in full—time work at 61 and 62 inthis simulation
is an artifact of the manner in which the simulationswere done. More
specifically, all individuals were startedin the simulations at age
25, and under these circumstances allindividuals would begin replacing
years in their average monthly earningscalculations, andwouldhence
experience a reduction in the returns tocontinuing ftill—timc work, two
yearsbefore theearly retirement age (this assumes thatif the early
retirement age were to change, the number of yearsused in the average
monthly earnings calculations would changeaccordingly). In the other
simulations reported in this paper, a similareffect can be found, but
the impact of this effect is before age 60,which fa Is outside the
range for which the simulations areillustrated in the figures.-32
than actuarially fair for most individuals, and hence the change would
have almost no effect because almost no one would find it advantageous
to begincollecting at the earlier date.(4)In the last simulation of
this section, one—half of the benefits are taxed at a uniform 30
percent rate, which is the equivalent of a reduction in benefits to 85
percent of the levels they would otherwise be. Such a tax could be
expected to raise full—time work at most ages by a few tenths of a
percentage point, with a corresponding decline in full retirement and
relatively little effect on part—time work. This result suggests that
any change in the benefit structure which has the effect of raising or
lowering benefits uniformly are unlikely to change labor supply and
retirement behavior by much, primarily because they do not create large
substitution incentives between years.
VII. Better than Fair Actuarial Returns in the 1983 Rules
The Social Security amendments of 1983 contain one implication
which was rarely mentioned in the public debate, but which nevertheless
follows from the manner in which the rules were changed. Specifically,
under the 1983 rules many wives will have very strong incentives to
delay registering for Social Security benefits even if they are
eligible for the benefits and the husbands are not working sufficiently
that any benefits would be lost to the earnings test. The incentives
reflect the fact that under the 1983 rules, for the first couple of
years after they attain early retirement age, for most wives actuarial
returns to delaying registration are much better than fair.
To illustrate, consider a 62—year—old wife who is deciding whether-.33
or not to postpone registration for another year. Withfiveyears of
reduction at 8 1/3 percent per year, the amount she would be eligible
to collect at age 62 would be just 58 percent of her full benefits.If
she delays until age 63, she gives up this amount and gets in return an
increase of 8 1/3 percent of the full benefits from age 63 on——that is
to say, all her future benefits are increased by 14.3 percent
(calculated by dividing 8 1/3 percent by .58). If her husband is the
same age, then for each dollar of benefits postponed duringher 62nd
year, she may expect to recover about $1.77in discounted future
benefits. Analogous figures for other ages are shown in the top part
of Table 1. The age differential between the wife and her husband
enters because after the husband dies, the wife becomes eligiblefor
widow's benefits, and any decision on whether or nottopostpone
registering for wife's benefits will have no effect on her potential
widow's benefits, The general story told in the top half of the table
is that there are very strong incentives to postpone registering at age
62, fairly strong incentives at age 63, and somewhatmilder incentives
at age 64. The bottom half of the table presents the corresponding
figures for actuarial returns under the 1977 rules. Asthe figures
indicate, for most wives there is a mild inducement to postpone
registration until 63 under the 1977 rules, butin general the
incentives to postpone registration at any given age under the 1977
rules are not nearly as strong as the incentives under the1983 rules.
As long as it is actuarially advantageous for thewife to postpone
registering and she in fact does so, the labor supplydecisions of the
husband do not cause the wife to lose benefits. Once thewifedoes.34
Table 1





a Thefigures in the table are calculated as the ratio between the in-
crease in the present discounted value of future benefits and the amount
of benefits foregone if the wife postpones registering for benefits at
the indicated age. The real interest rate used in the calculations is
0.01.
b
This differential is positive if the husband is older and negative if
the wife is older.
—2 1.26 1.08 0.94
—1 1.45 1.23 1.06 0.92
0 1.71 1.43 1.22 1.05 0.91
1 1.66
•
1.39 1.18 1.02 0.88
2 1.60 1.34 1.14 0.98 0.85
3 1.55 1.30 1.10 0.95 0.82
4 1.50 1.25 1.06 0.91 0.78












0 1.33 1.15 1.00
1 1.29 1.11 0.97
2 1.25 1.08 0.93
3 1.21 1.04 0.90
4 1.17 1.00 0.87
5 1.12 0.96 0.83register for benefits, the work decisions of the husband do affect the
benefits of the wife if he earns more than the test amount, since she
cannot collect benefits for a larger fraction of the year than he does.
In short, if the wife is subject to less than actuarially fair returns,
it will lower the net returns for continued work by the husband, but
the reverse is not true, for if the wife faces a better than
actuarially fair return, she can collect this return simply by delaying
registration regardless of the work decisions of the husband.
With such high actuarial returns for a wife in her early sixties
who postpones registration, it is possible to ask whether these returns
can be used to induce the husband to continue working. Themechanism
would be to allow the wife to postpone registration only if the husband
continued to work. With thisquestion in mind, a simula tion was done
whichpermittedwives to postpone benefits only if the husband were
losing benefits to the earnings test. The results of this simulation
1
are illustrated in Figure 9.It is clear that such a change would
1Inthis simulation, a further change inthe rules was made to
permitindividualsto begin receiving any increased benefits immediately
rather than waiting until age 67, regardless of whether or notthe
individual had registered. Otherwise, the wife of an individualwhose
full—time earnings were insufficient to cause his benefits tobe
exhaustedby the earnings test wouldfind that by regisLering and
collecting part—year benefits, the return on her remainingbenefits may
well be negative even though the returns from simply postponing
rcgist ration were posit ive.'thisci feet ,whicharises from the fact
that once a person registers for benefits, he orshe must waituntil
age 67 before the benefits are adjusted,runs contrary to the spirit of
the simulation, sothe effect was suppressed by allowing individuals to
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indeed work in the direction indicated, but the magnitude of the
effects are not very large, increasing full—time work by only slightly
more than a percentage point at 62 and 63 and less thereafter.The
reason for this rather weak result is that although the returns are
high per dollar of benefits that the wife loses, the returns perdollar
income that the husband earns are considerably less. For instance, if
a husband with a 62—year—old wife earns an additionaldollar of income
over the test amount, the wife's benefits are reduced by lessthan 14
cents, first because his benefits are reduced only 33 cents perdollar
of income, and second because her benefit reductions are porportional-38
to his, and her benefits are less than half of his (.58 percent of
one—half the PIA versus at least seven times the full PIA). When
account is taken of the fact that some fraction of the husband's full—
time earnings will be below the earnings test, the apparently large
actuarial returns to the wife may serve to increase the husband's full—
time compensation by only 5 percent or so. The net result is that
tying the wife's postponement to the husband's continued work provides
only a very mild additional inducement to further work and generates
only a small increase in full—time work effort.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
The simulations of this paper have suggested that the rules
changes specified in the recent Social Security legislation will have
two principal effects. First, the peak of retirement activity at age
65 will be reduced somewhat and spread over later years. Second, while
total work activity at 65 will be increased slightly, the fraction of
individuals over 65 working part—time will fall relative to the
fraction working full—time. This has evident implications for other
groups who are competing with older workers for full—time or part—time
jobs. The rules changes largely eliminate the effect on labor supply
of actuarial penalties arising from the Social Security system, and as
a result it appears that almost exactly the same results with regard to
labor supply and retirement behavior could have been obtained by
eliminating the earnings test entirely. Under either set of
circumstances, the only real influence that Social Security rules would
have on labor supply would be the effects arising if additional work.39
displaces earlier years in the calculation of ÂME.
There are several qualifications which should be kept in mind
whileinterpreting these results. Most importantly,. these results
refer to the long—run effects of a change in the rules, and as noted at
the outset, apply only to white males who are not self—employed. In
addition, individuals in the sample are presumed to average 35 yearsof
earnings, with no maximum, in the ÂME calculations, a situationwhich
will eventually be true for most people but is not necessarily true for
the actual cohorts eligible for benefits today. Also, the modeland
the simulations assume that a uniform set of rules are in forcefor any
particular simulation, and that these rules are correctly perceived by
individuals. The paper has not attempted to ask questions pertaining
to the reactions of individuals who had thought that theywould be
subject to one set of rules but find out in themiddle of their life
cycles that they will in fact be subject to another.It is not that we
view this as an uninteresting question. But the model usedin the
paper is not as robust as one wouldlike in terms of answering
questions about unanticipated change, and it is not easy to seehow to
get around this problem without the availabilityof data sets that have
somewhat better consumption data than is available in theRHS.'Nor
does the model allow individuals to make mistakesin their maximizing
calculations.
Another important qualification is that the simulationsindicate
howolder workers might change their labor supply in the faceof the
various Social Security rules changes, but it does not considerwhether
this change in supply would change the wage offers of theindividuals
1See Gustman and Steinmeier (1983a) for further discussion of
this point.—40
and through this the amount of work theyactually do. Moreover, only
one potential change in the pension structure offered by the firms was
considered. In short, this paper looks at the supply side of the
market for these workers and indicates how the supply curve mightmove.
It does not consider either the demand side of the market or the
ultimate effects on wages and labor supply after a new equilibrium has
been reached. This shortcoming is particularly serious in markets
where older workers make up a significant part of the labor force,as
in the market for part—time work.
An additional qualification is that the simulations are done using
the actual pension coverage that was found for the sample for the
Retirement History Survey. Pension coverage today is considerably
greater than it was for the individuals in that sample. Since most
pensions are not even as actuarially fair as the 1972 or 1977 Social
Security rules, much less as the system will be after the changes
mandated by the recent legislation, there is the possibility that
retirement behavior may be driven more by features of the pension and
less by the nature of the Social Security system than has been
indicatedby these simulations.
A futher qualification is that in the simulations, the spouse is
presumedto draw the wife's benefits rather than drawing any benefits
for which she might be eligible on her own. This is probably not a
major qualification, however, since both under the 1977 rules and the
1983 rules the wife's actuarial return to delaying the receipt of
benefits is either close to fair or better than fair until she reaches
the normal retirement age. By the time she reaches normal retirement-'41
ageand begins to be a potentially signficant factor in the husband's
labor supply calculations, however, the husband in most cases will have
already reached a decision either to retire or to work part—time at a
level where he is influenced in only a minor way by Social Security
considerations. That is to say, inmost cases the incentives created
by the wife's benefits do not play a major role in the husband's
calculations, so that it probably does not matter a great deal whether
the model treats her as drawing benefits as a wife or drawing benefits
in her own right, if she is eligible to do so.
A related qualification has to do with the benefits a widow is
eligible to draw. Unlike the wife's benefits, the widow's benefits
enter in a more prominent manner into the calculations of the marginal
benefit of additional work, because the amount the husband's benefits
are reduced or augmented by the early retirement penalty or the delayed
retirement credit are likely to be the limiting factor to the amount
that the widow will be eligible to receive. Accordingly, any decision
of his which would affect the amount by which his benefits are reduced
or augmented will change the widow's benefits. The question which
arises with respect to widow's benefits is the extent to which the
husband takes account in his labor supply calculations of the potential
benefits to be received by his widow after he is no longer around.
Since the widow's benefits are always an additional positive inducement
in the marginal labor supply decisions, a failure to include fully the
widow's benefits in his calculations would probably induce an
individual to retire at a slightly earlier age than these simulations
might indicate.-P42
A final qualification has to do with the fact that the model
employed in these simulations takes no account of any potential
liquidity constraint facing an individual. The degree to which older
individuals are really liquidity—constrained is notcompletely evident.
On the one hand, models such as this would predict that most
individuals should enter their retirementyears with a positive level
of assets as long as the expected Social Security and pensionreceipts
fail to replace completely the formerwage. On the other hand, for
many individuals these assets take the form largely of housing, which
is not a very liquid asset. If individuals are postponing retirement
simply because they are liquidity—constrajned, then most of the effect
of this constraint should show up as an increased amount of retirement
around age 62, when individuals first become eligible for benefits
under the system. However, simulations previously done using a closely
related model for individuals during the actual sample period seemed to
do an adequate job of explaining the bunching of retirement atage 62
even without invoking liquidity constraints as a part of the model.'
Further, even if liquidity constraints do cause some amount of bunching
of retirement at age 62, this should not strongly affect the results of
most of these simulations, since the recent changes in the Social
Security rules and all but two of the hypothetical changes considered
in th i s paper do notentail a cliauge inilie age at wlii cii ud i vid ua is
can first obtain benefits, and so relieve their liquidity constraints.
This consideration might inject a note of caution, though, in
interpreting those simulations that do entail a change in the early
retirement age.
'See Gustrnan and Steinmejer(1983a) for a discussion of these results.-43
On a final note, the Social Security system is closer to actuarial
neutrality under the 1977 rules than it was a decade ago, and after the
recent legislation takes effect, it will be very close to being
completely actuarially neutral. Under these circumstances, it will be
difficult to change the various formulas in the Social Security system
to make them better than actuarially fair so as to encourage later
work, since under the current rules the individual is always free to
collect better than actuarially fair returns simply by delaying
registration for benefits. In order to use the Social Security system
as more of an inducement to work .than it is now, it will be necessary
to change the rules so that an individual eligible to collect benefits
must start collecting them unless the husband continues to work, and to
make returns for delaying benefits for this reason more than
actuarially fair. This would probably have to entail further increases
in the early retirement penalty and the delayed retirement credit for
the husband, however, since our findings indicate that simply tying the
postponement of benefits to continued work will not be sufficient to
increase work effort by much under the 1983 rules, even with the
apparent high actuarial returns to women.-44
References
Blinder, Alan S. "Private Pensions and Public Pensions: Theory and
Fact." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no.
902. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, June
1982.
Blinder, Alan S., Gordon, Roger and Wise, Donald. "Rhetoric and
Reality in Social Security Analysis——A Rejoinder." National Tax
Journal 34 (December 1981): 473—478.
Burkhauser, Richard V. and Turner, John. "Can Twenty-Five Million
Americans Be Wrong?——A Response to Blinder, Gordon and Wise."
National Tax Journal 34 (December 1981): 467—472.
Burtless, Gary and Moffitt, Robert A. "The Effect of Social Security
on Labor Supply of the Aged: The Joint Choice of Retirement Date
and Post—Retirement Hours of Work." Mimeographed. February 1983.
Clark, Robert L. and Gohmann, Stephen A. "Retirement and the Acceptance
of Social Security Benefits." Mimeographed. 1982.
Gordon, Roger H. "Social Security and Labor Supply Incentives."
Contemporary Policy Issues (April 1983): 16—22.
Gordon, Roger H. and Blinder, Alan S. "Market Wages, Reservation Wages
and Retirement." Journal of Public Economics 14 (1980): 277—308.
Gustman,ALan L. andSteinmeier, Thomas L."A Structural Ret irl9nent
Model."Mimoegraphed.Hanover, N.H.: May l983a.
Gustman, Alan L. and Steinmeier, Thomas L. "Minimum hours Constraints
and Retirement Behavior." Contemporary Policy Issues (April
1983b):77—91.45
Gustman, Alan L. and Steinmeier, ThomasL. "Partial Retirement and the
Analysis of Retirement Behavior."Industrial and Labor Relations
Review (January 1984, forthcoming).
Gustman, Alan L. and Steinineier, ThomasL. "Partial Retirement and
Wage Profiles for OlderWorkers." National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper no. 1000. cambridge, Mass.:National
Bureau of Economic Research, October1982.
Gustman, Alan L. and Steinmeier, ThomasL. "Structural Retirement
Models." Final Report to the U.S. Departmentof Labor. Washing—
ton: April l983c.
Lazear, Edward. "Pensions as SeverencePay." National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 944. Cambridge,Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, July1982.
Mitchell, Olivia S. and Fields, Gary S."Economic Incentives to Retire:
A Qualitative Choice Approach." NationalBureau of Economic
Research Working Paper no. 1096. Cambridge,Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, March1983.
Sammartiflo, Frank. "The Timing ofSocial Security Acceptance by Older
Men: Examining the FinancialIncentives." Technical Analysis
Paper No. 24, Office of theAssistant Secretary for Policy and
Evaluation. Washington, D.C.: u.s.Departmentof Health and Human
Services, January 1982.Appendix A
Specification, Estimation, and Simulation of a Life-Cycle
Model of Retirement Behavior
In previous work we have specified and estimated a life-cycle struc-
tural model which is capable of addressing the question of labor supply
response to Social Security changes. This appendix will briefly sketch
the specification of the model and its estimation; a more complete de-
scription is contained in Gustman and Steinmeier (1983a). The last part
of this appendix will also indicate more precisely how the simulations
reported in the body of the paper were carried out.
A. A Life-Cycle Model of Retirement Behavior. The theoretical
model used in this study is a variation on the standard life-cycle model.
In this model an individual can choose between full—tinie work or part-
time work at a lower waae. In this setting, the individual chooses time
paths for labor supply and consumption so as to maximize the lifetime
utility function given by
T
U =fu[C(t),L(t), t] dt
0




where the various variables have already been defined in the text. AsA-2
MaCurdy (1981) has shown, the problem may be reduced to the problem of
maximizing the following quantity at each moment in time
u[C(t), L(t), t] +kS(t)
where k is a parameter whose value is constant across time and S(t) is
the discounted value of savings at time t, defined as
S(t) =et{[w (t)H(t) + w(t)H(t)]-c(t))
In this problem, the individual generates utility during the current pe-
riod in three ways: directly through consumption, directly through lei-
sure, or indirectly through savings which are then converted todirect
utility in other periods. At each moment in time the individual chooses
how much to consume and how much to work in which type of job, and
thereby how much leisure he will have and how much savings he will gen-
erate, so as to maximize the utility, both direct and indirect, generated
during the period. In this formulation, the parameter k has anatural
interpretation as the marginal utility of discounted savings either gen-
erated or used during the period. Its value depends upon the wage of-
fers and the shape of the utility function throughout the entire life
cycle,and it is thus the vehiclethrough whichdeci Si OflS and opportuni -
ties in other periods affect the choices in the current period. The ap-
propriate value of k is the value such that when the abovemaximization
problem is solved at each moment in time, the volume of savingsgenerated
and used over the life cycle just satisfies the budget constraint,whichA- 3





To complete the specification, it is necessary to choose a specific
parametric form for u which specifies how the explanatory variables and
stochastic terms affect utility and to specify the nature of the paramet-
ric distributions for the stochastic variables. The utility function
used in the empirical analysis is the CES function:
X B+
u[C(t), L(t), t] =sign(){[C(t)]+ et_ [L(t)]ó}
where 5 andare time—invariant individual stochastic variables related
to the within-period elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure and to the relative weight attached to leisure, respectively.5
is assumed to come from an exponential distribution
f(o) =ye6),<i
where y is a positive parameter defining the distribution. The normal
distribution is used for the stochastic distribution of :
n(p5, o)
with the parameter p providing a means by which 5 andmay be corre-
lated.A-4
B. Estimation Procedure. The maximum likelihoodestimation proce-
dure is based on the fact that for a given set of valuesfor the parame-
ters of the model ,anobserved set of retirement decisions by a particu-
lar individual is consistent with only a limited rangeof values for the
stochastic variables. To illustrate the technique, consider anindi-
vidual who is observed to be fully retired, working part-time,or working
full—time as of a specific date. For a given set of parametervalues,
his observed behavior is consistent with only a subsetof possible
values for 6 and E,asillustrated in the top panel of Figure A.l. For
example, all combinations of values of 6and Einthe area denoted as
which includes high values of c signifying a large weight onleisure in
the utility function, imply in the model thatthe individual would be re-
tired as of the specific date. Similarly, the regiondenoted as in-
cludes generally low values of c, signifyingthat the individual places
relatively little value on leisure, andcombinations of 6 and c in this
regionimply that the individual would be workingfull-time as of the
date. Finally, for individuals with a sufficientlyiow elasticity of
substitution between consumptionand leisure and with an intermediate
valueof c such that they fall in the region c2in the diagram,the model
impliesthat they would be working part-time as ofthe date.
Similarregions can be defined for anindividual whoisobservedin
severaldifferent years. Figure A.lb illustrates atypical case involv-
ing observations in three different years.In this diagram, the right-
hand inverted Y separates the (6,c) planeinto three parts according to
whether the individual would be fully retired,working part-time, or
working full-time in the first year.The remaining inverted Ys defineI' i yir A.1(II S t. i i ab 1 rre pnncl i nc
() I'u I I rm'nt (jwtlcu
e
A-5A-6
similar areas for the other two years. These inverted Y's will be to
the left of the original inverted V due to the effect of the time-
dependent explanatory variables in in the utility function, which will
cause the individual to place a relatively greater weight onleisure as
he grows older. This, in turn, implies that the region for which thein-
dividual will be fully retired will be larger in the second and third
years than in the first year, and the regionfor which the individual
will be working full-time will be smaller. In combination, the threein-
verted V's defined in this manner divide the (6,c) plane into aseries
of regions corresponding to various retirement sequences. For instance,
the region FPR defines a region of values for 6 and c forwhich the in-
dividual would be working full-time in Year 1 and part-time inYear 2,
and would be fully retired in Year 3.
To calculate the probability that individual i would havechosen
the observed retirement sequence S, first find the region c25()which
defines the combinations of 6 and c which would have causedthe indi-
vidual to have followed the observed retirement sequence S•Note that
the boundaries of this region depend explicitly on the parametervector
,sincethese parameters in part determine how the individualwill be-
have when confronted with a given time path of wages.The probability
that the stochastic variables would have taken onvalues in the region
and hence would have generated the sequence S. is:
Pr(S1;6) =ff(i3)
f(5, c; y, c, p)dEd6
Si —
where0 is a vector of all of the parameters to beestimated (0, y,A-7
arid p) and where the joint probability density function f of the stochas-
tic variablesand Edependson the parameters y, c and p, as noted ex-
plicitly in the function. The likelihood function of the sample is cal-





where N is the number of individuals in the sample. Maximum likelihood
estimates of the parameters of the model are found by maximizing this
likelihood function with respect to the parameters. On the assumption
that the specification of the model is correct, these estimates are
known to have optimal properties for large samples.
C. Empirical Specifications. The data set used in this study is
the Retirement History Survey (RHS), a random longitudinal sample of ap-
proximately 11,000 households. The RHS consists of households whose
heads were between the ages of 58 and 63 in 1969. Detailed question-
naires were administered to these households every two years from 1969
through 1979. This study uses the survey results through 1975, which
were the latest results available at the time the study was begun. Due
to the complexity of the estimation and simulation procedures, the sam-
ple actually actually used for this paper is formed by taking every
tenth household from the RHS, and the sample is further restricted to
white males who were not self-employed when working full-time. Observa-
tions are dropped if critical information is missing, although a majorA-8
effort is made to impute missing information if at all possible.
In view of the complexity of estimating an optimal control model
a parsimonious choice is made for the set of explanatory variables to be
included in the vector X.,.The explanatory variables used in the em-
pirical analysis include a constant, age, a dummy variable equal to
unity if the individual has previously experienced a long-term health
problem, and vintage. The coefficients associated with these variables
are 2' and 13g.For positive values of and 132 (the coeffi-
cients of age and the health dummy variable, respectively), the utility
function for an individual places an increasing emphasis on leisure over
time, which eventually causes retirement in the model.
The model requires two time paths for wage offers, one for the wage
offer for full-time work and one for the offer for part-time work. It
should be evident that whereas we have called WF(t) and W(t) 'wage of-
fers," what is really required for the estimation and simulations is a
measure of total compensation for additional work, including the wage
se as well as any increases in pension values and Social Security
values attributable to the additional work. In order to impute the time
paths for wages p se, separate wage equations are imputed forfull-
time work and for part-time work. From whatever information can be ex-
tracted from the data about an individual's job history, a pair of wage
offer curves is constructed using available information about theindi-
vidual's wages as an indication of the general height of the curves and
allowing the profile of the wage paths to be determined by the tenure
and experience variables in the wage equations. For full-time work,the
pension component of compensation is calculated on thebasis of availa-A-9
ble information on normal and early retirement ages, tenure in the job,
and the level of benefits. With no information available about the type
of pension, all pensions are treated as though they were of a defined
benefit type with payments proportional to years of service and with re-
ductions for early retirement which are imputed from industry data re-
ported by Hatch etal. (1981). The Social Security component of compen-
sation is based on the set of rules in force during the sample period,
including the effects of the automatic benefit recomputation as stressed
by Blinder, Gordon, and Wise and the effect of the lack of indexing of
the early retirement penalty as stressed by Burkhauser and Turner
(1982).l The calculations use the individual's actual coveredwages
through age 55 and imputed wages thereafter, since after that age the
Social Security earnings records increasingly fail to reflect potential
earnings for those who partially or fully retire.
The retirement sequences used in the estimation procedure are
formed on the basis of a question which asked the respondents whether
they considered themselves to be completely retired, partially retired,
or not retired at all. For most individuals, the retirement sequence
consists of a set of four observations (one observation every two years
from 1969 to 1975).In cases where the individual dropped out of the
sample etierh because of death or refusal to answer the questionnaire,
Due to the additional complexity that would have been created in
the estimation program, the effect of recomputing the AME is calculated
only for full-time work and not for part-time work. This implicitly as-
sumes that annual earnings from partial retirement work are low enough
that they do not replace any years already used in the AME calculations,
or alternatively, that the effect of a change in AME is not an important
part of the Social Security component of part-time compensation relative
to either effect.A-lO
the retirement sequence includes fewer than four observations. The es-
timation procedure described above can be used for any number of obser-
vations on retirement status, and hence it is possible to use whatever
observations are available for each individual in the data set. Indi-
vidual responses are taken at face value except for some cases where an
individual classified himself as partially retired even though he was
fairly clearly fully retired for purposes of labor-force participation.
Problems arise in a few cases wherein individuals went backwards along
the sequence of full-time work, part-time work, and full retirement,
since regression along this sequence would in general not be generated
by any combination of the stochastic terms within the contextof the
model. For such individuals, the estimation procedure uses whateverin-
formation in the retirement sequence that provides useful information
about the slope and curvature of the individual 's indifference curves
between consumption and leisure and ignores those parts of the sequence
which contain little such information but would require a considerably
more complicated model (involving perhaps thereactions of individuals
to unexpected occurrences) to explain adequately.
D. Parameter estimates. Table A.l presents the parameteresti-
mates obtained by applying the estimation proceduredescribed above.
All of the parameters with the exception of the coefficient onvintage
are highly significant at any conventionallevel ,andthe small stan-
dard errors indicate that most of them are determined quiteprecisely.
Three of these parameters have particularly importantimplications about


















Est imat'd standard trrors are in parentheses.
A—liA-l2
that the median value of the elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure in the utility function is 0.87, which is just on the
inelastic side of unity. Within the context of the life-cycle model
used in the estimation procedure, this value reflects in part therather
weak correlation between the age of retirement and the general level of
lifetime wages (a high value of the substitution elasticity, for exam-
ple, implies a strong negative correlation betweenthem) and in part the
relative proportion of the sample who showed themselves to be willing to
accept a lower hourly rate of pay in return for beingable to work part-
time(a high value of the substitution elasticity would indicatethat
veryfewpeople would be willing to make this trade-off).The estimated
valueis considerably lower than the value of 10 found by Gordonand
Blinder, who did not use any information on the choiceof full-time work
versus part-time work at a lower wage in their study.The second impor-
tant parameter is 1l the parameter which determinesthe rate at which
the leisure term is gaining weight in the utilityfunction as the indi-
vidual ages, and hence the rate at which the indifference curvesbetween
consumption and leisure are becoming steeper overtime. The value of
this parameter indicates that the indifference curvesbecome steep
fairly rapidly, increasing their slope by 23 percent peryear.1 In
large measure, this rather rapid ratereflects the fact that among the
individuals who do in fact work part-time, the lengthof the period that
they spend in part-time work is typically fairlyshort. If the indif-
1The percentage figures in this paragraph arecalculated as 100
(ec -1),where c is the estimated coefficient value.A-13
ference curves were becoming steeper only slowly, then one would expect
that many of the individuals who work part—time would do so for a rela-
tively long period of time, and itisthis consideration which leads the
estimation procedure to its rather high estimate of the effect of age on
the slopes of the curves. The third critical parameter is ,whichin-
dicates the degree of heterogeneity of individual preferences regarding
the weight of the leisure term in the utility function. The estimated
value of 0.99 suggests that there is a high degree of heterogeneity among
individuals, with a single standard deviation in the stochastic prefer-
ence variable representing a change of 169 percent in the slope of an in-
difference curve at a given age. This large variation in individual
preferences combined with the relatively smaller yearly effects of age
on the slope of the indifference curves causes individuals to retire
over a range of ages beginning in the mid-50's and extending into the
70 s.
E. The Simulation Method. The simulations are performed as fol-
lows. For each individual in the sample, the value of the vector and
the wage paths WF(t) and W(t) are calculated according to the procedure
described above. The individual will retire, according to the life-
cycle model, at some age R whose value depends on the stochastic varia-
bles ó and .Let be the set of all combinations ofand Ewhich
imply that this individualwouldretire at age R. Then the probability
thatan individual with the characteristics indicated byand facing
the wage paths WF(t) and W(t)willretire at age R is found by integrat-
ing theprobability density function for c5andoverthe region c1(R).A-14
f(R) =ffc(R)
f(5,e) dcd6
For the entire sample, the simulated percentage of individuals who re-
tire at a given age R is found by taking the average value of f(R) over
the sample:
f(R) = il f(R).
The same procedure can be used to calculate the distributionof any other
statistic of interest concerning the simulated retirement decisionsof
the sample.
The simulations are based on a set of assumptions about theSocial
Security system that are intended no so much to reflectthe effects of
the system on the cohorts receiving Social Security today asto indicate
the long—term effects of changes in the system. More specifically,the
Social Security system which is used in the simulationsincludes the fol-
lowing features:Cl) The number of earnings to be included in theAME
calculations is found by subtracting 27 from the age whenindividuals
were first eligible to begin drawing earlyretirement benefits. No
maximum is applied to the earnings, which implicitly assumesthat the
maximum is high enough that it does not affect a largenumber of indi-
viduals. Earnings in part—time work are assumed tobe sufficiently low
that they will not affect the AME computations, anassumption which is
made to simplify the computations and which is particularlylikely to be
true in cases when earnings from earlier years areindexed. (2) The PIA
is based on a calculation made at the earlyretirement age using theA-l5
rates and bend points for the appropriate year. No maximum or minimum
is applied to this calculation. Afterwards, the benefits are assumed to
be adjusted upward to reflect any increases in the cost of living and any
increases in the AME calculations. (3) Benefits are reduced for each
month before the normal retirement age that the individual registers for
benefits, with a recalculation done at the normal retirement age to re-
flectany time during which the individual lost benefits due to the earn-
ings test. After the normal retirement age, future benefits arein-
creased for every month's worth of benefits that are lost to the earn-
ings test.The individual is presumed to make an actuarial calculation
and to postpone accepting benefits until it is no longer actuarially ad-
vantageous for him to do so. At this point he registers for benefits as
soon as his earnings fall to a level which would allow him to collect
them,and any earnings after that point are subject to the earnings
test.1 Earnings above the earnings test cause benefits to be reducedby
Eventhough it would be actuarially advantageous to give up an
entire year's worth of benefits if he did not work,an individual at age
62who decides to work enough so that most of his benefits would be post-
poned mayfind it advantageous to postpone registering altogether. The
reason is that if the individual postpones registering, any increase in
benefits will take effect immediately, whereas if the benefits are regis-
tered for and then foregone, increases in future benefits will not ac-
crue until the normal retirement age. However, this effect is likely to
be rather small in comparison with other changes in incentives occurring
because of the Social Security system (i.e., the wife reaching normal re-
tirement age and hence losing permanently any foregone benefits, or the
husband reaching normal retirement age and facing a very sharp drop in
the actuarial return to foregone benefits). Furthermore, it would con-
siderably complicate the solution of the life-cycle model to take ac-
count of this effect because the decision depends on future labor supply
decisions. For these reasons, the effect is not considered in the simu-
lation, and instead it is assumed that once the actuarial rate falls be-
low unity and the individual's earnings fall to the point where he can
begin drawing benefits, he does so.A-16
a fraction of earnings above the test amount. (4)Allwives are as-
sumed to make their calculations as if they were eligible for one-half
the husband's PIA, with the benefits reduced for each month before the
normal retirement age that the wife registers for the benefits. The
wife is presumed to postpone benefits until the point in time where it
becomes actuarially disadvantageous to delay any further, and then to
register. After she registers, her benefits in any particular year are
reduced because of the effect of the earnings test, but if she is below
the normal retirement age some of the lost benefits will be recovered
via increases in future benefits. (5) A widow is eligible, starting two
years before the early retirement age, for benefits that arereduced for
each month before the normal retirement age that she registers for the
benefits. She also is presumed to delay the registration until it be-
comes actuarially disadvantageous to do so further. Her benefits are
limited to the amount her husband would have been eligible to receive,
including any early retirement penalties and/or delayed retirement
credits, as long as the benefits would not fall below 82.5percentof
the primary insurance amount for this reason.
In addition to the assumptions regarding Social Security that are
used in the simulation, the following other assumptions and adjustments
are also made. First, the growth rates of real and nominal wagerates
are presumed to be equal to the 35-year average growth rate duringthe
period 1947-1982, and the real interest rate used in thecalculations is
presumed to be approximately equal to the growth rate ofreal wages.
Secondly, in order to simulate the effects of the Social Security changes
at approximately today's wage levels, all nominal wage and pension quan-A-17
titles are adjusted upward to levels appropriate for an individual who
would be 65 in 1985. Finally, in order to reflect an important change
in the law since the period of the Retirement History Survey, the wage
streams constructed for the purposes of the simulation presume that if
the individual faced a mandatory retirement age before 70, the value of
the mandatory retirement age for the purposes of the simulations is
changed to 70.Appendix BTabI B.1
Simulations of the Effects of Various Sets of Social Security Rules.
percent retiring, by age










































A. Under 1972 Rules.














































































































percent retiring, by age
percentpercentpercent
from full—from all working working fully
time work work full-time part—time retired
D. Under 1983 Rules, but with no Earnings
Test.
age
60 8.2 6.3 75.1 6.4 18.5
61 6.8 6.1 68.3 7.1 24.6
62 9.6 8.4 58.7 8.3 33.0
63 8.2 7.9 50.5 8.6 40.9
64 8.6 8.4 41.9 8.7 49.4
65 11.1 10.0 30.8 9.8 59.4
66 6.9 7.4 24.0 9.2 66.8
67 5.5 6.2 18.5 8.4 73.1
68 5.0 5.9 13.5 7.5 79.0
69 3.7 4.7 9.8 6.6 83.6
70 4.4 5.0 5.4 6.0 88.6
average age 62.6 63.7
aThese averages are calculated from the distributions of retirement
ages ranging between 56 and 72, and not simply from the 10 year
age range reported in these tables.TabTh B.2
Simulations of the Effects of the Individual Components of the
1983 Changes in the Social Security Rules.
percentretiring, byage
percentpercentpercent
fromfull— fromall workingworking fully
timework work full—timepart—timeretired























A.Increase Normal Retirement Age to
age Penalty for Retirement at Age 62.
60 8.3 6.4 75.0 6.4 18.6
61 6.9 6.1 68.2 7.2 24.6
62 9.7 8.5 58.5 8.3 33.2
63 9.1 8.4 49.4 9.0 41.6
64 9.3 9.0 40.1 9.3 49.6
65 10.1 9.2 30.0 10.2 59.8
66 7.4 8.0 22.6 9.6 67.8
67 8.9 8.1 13.7 10.4 75.9
68 4.0 5.3 9.7 9.1 81.2
69 3.4 4.5 6.3 7.9 85.8
70 1.3 2.9 5.0 6.3 88.7
averageage 62.4 63.6
age














C.Reduce Benefit Reduction Rate to $1 for Every $3
in Earnings over the Earnings Test Amount.
60 8.5 6.5 71,./t 6.6 19.0
61. 6.9 6.3 67.5 7.2
62 9.7 8.6 57.8 8.3 33.9
63 8.4 8.0 /i9.4 8.7 41.9
64 8.7 8.6 40.7 8.7 50.6
65 14.2 11.9 26.5 1.1.0 62.5
66 6.6 7.5 19.8 10.2 70.0
67 5.4 6.1 14.4 9.5 76.1
68 4.1 5.4 10.3 8.2 81.5
69 3.3 4.3 7.0 7.2 85.8
























62.5 63.6Table B.2 (continued)
percent retiring, by age percentpercentpercent
from full- from all working workingfully
timework work full-time part-time retired
age
D. Delay Inflation Adjustment by One-half Year.
60 8.4 6.5 74.6 6.5 18.9
61 6.9 6.3 67.6 7.2 25.2
62 9.7 8.6 57.9 8.4 33.7
63 8.4 8.0 49.5 8.7 41.8
64 8.6 8.6 40.8 8.8 50.4
65 16.4 13.0 24.4 12.1 63.5
66 6.0 6.9 18.5 11.2 70.3
67 5.4 6.2 13.1 10./4 76.5
68 3.9 5.3 9.2 9.0 81.8
69 3.1 5.3 6.1 7.8 86.1
70 1.2 2.8 4.9 6.2 88.9
average age 62.3 63.5Table 1.3
Simulations of the Effects of Potential Changes in Social Security
Rules.
percent retiring, by age
percentpercentpercent
from full— from all working workingfully
timework work full—time part-time retired
age A. Increase Penalty for Early Retirement to 10% per Year.
60 8.4 6.4 74.4 66 19.0
61 6.9 6.3 67.5 7.2 25.3
62 9.6 8.5 58.0 8.3 33.7
63 8.2 7.9 49.8 8.6 41.6
64 8.3 8.4 41.5 8.5 50.0
65 17.2 13.6 24.3 12.1 63.6
66 5.9 6.9 18.4 11.1 70.5
67 5.4 6.1 13.0 10.4 76.6
68 3.9 5.2 9.1 9.0 81.9
69 3.1 4.3 6.0 7.8 86.2
70 1.2 2.8 4.8 6.1 89.1
average age 62.3 63.5
B. Eliminate Early Retirement. age
60 6.4 5.5 76.6 5.4 18.0
61 7.0 6.2 69.6 6.3 24.1
62 9.5 8.6 60.1 7.2 32.7
63 10.9 9.4 49.2 8.6 42.2
64 8.3 8.3 40.9 8.6 50.5
65 17.1 13.5 23.8 12.2 61;.0
66 5.8 6.8 18.0 11.2 70.8
67 5.4 6.1 12.6 10.5 76.9
68 3.8 5.2 8.8 9.1 82.1
69 3.0 4.3 5.9 7.8 86.3
70 1.2 2.8 4.7 6.1 89.2
average age 62.3 63.5
C. Allow Early Retirement at Age 60 with 66 2/3% of Full
Benefits.
age
60 6.6 5.6 74.6 6.5 18.9
61 6.8 6.2 67.8 7.1 25.1
62 9.7 8.5 58.1 8.3 3:3.6
63 8.3 8.0 49.8 8.5 41.7
64 8.8 8.7 41.0 8.7 50.3
65 16.2 13.0 24.8 11.9 63.3
66 6.0 7.0 18.7 10.9 70.3
67 5.4 6.2 13.3 10.1 76.6
68 4.0 5.3 9.4 8.8 81.8
69 3.2 4.3 6.2 7.6 86.2
70 1.2 2.8 5.0 6.0 89.0
average age 62.3 63.5Table B.3 (continued)
percent retiring, by age percentpercentpercent
from full—from all working working fully
time work work full—time part—time retired
D. Impose 30% Tax on One—half of Benefits.
age
60 8.2 6.3 75.1 6.4
61 6.8 6.1 68.3 7.1 24.6
62 9.7 8.5 58.6 8.4 33.0
63 8.4 8.0 50.2 8.7 41.1
64 8.8 8.6 41.4 8.9 49.7
65 16.2 12.8 25.2 12.4 62.4
66 6.1 7.1 19.0 11.5 69.5
67 5.6 6.3 13.5 10.7 75.8
68 3.9 5.2 9.5 9.4 81.1
69 3.2 4.6 6.3 8.1 85.6
70 1.3 2.9 5.0 6.5 88.5
average age 62.3 63.6Table B.4
Simulations of the 1977 and 1983 Social Security Rules Under
a High Inflation Regime.
percent retiring, by age







































































































60 7.9 6.1 76.1
61 6.6 6.0 69.5
62 9.5 8.2 60.0
63 8.8 8.2 51.2
64 9.2 8.8 42.0
65 9.1 8.9 33.0
66 8.0 8.1 25.0
67 4.1 5.3 20.9
68 5.8 6.4 15.1
69 4.3 5.2 10.8
70 4.2 4.8 6.6
average age 62.8 63.8Table B.5
Simulations of the Effects of the 1977 and 1983 Social Security
Rules for Individuals Who Would Be Age 65 in Year 2000.
percent retiring, by age percentpercentpercent
from full— from any workingworking fully
time work work full—time part—time retired
A. Under 1977 Rules.
age
60 8.4 6.6 71.3 7.4 21.3
61 6.9 6.6 64.4 7.6 28.0
62 9.2 8.6 55.2 8.3 36.5
63 7.9 8.0 47.3 8.3 44.4
64 8.1 8.5 39.2 7.9 52.9
65 15.2 12.9 21i.0 10.2 65.8
66 5.7 6.8 18.3 9.1 72.6
67 5.0 6.0 13.3 8.1 78.6
68 3.9 5.0 9.4 7.0 83.6
69 3.0 4.2 6.4 5.7 87.9
70 1.2 2.5 5.2 4.4 90.4
average age 62.1 63.1
B. Under 1983 Rules.
age
60 8.2 6.4 72.0 7.4 20.6
61 6.8 6.5 65.3 7.6 27.1
62 9.1 8.4 56.2 8.4 35.4
63 8.8 8.5 47.4 8.7 43.9
64 8.7 8.8 38.7 8.5 52.8
65 9.4 9.2 29.3 8.8 61.9
66 7.0 7.8 22.3 8.0 69.7
67 3.8 5.2 18.5 6.7 74.8
68 5.2 6.0 13.3 5.9 80.8
69 3.9 4.9 9.4 4.9 85.7
70 3.4 4.0 6.0 4.3 89.7
average age 62.3 63.3Table B.6
Simulation of the 1983 Social Security Rules Under Assumption
That the Normal Retirement Ages in Private Pension
Plans WillChange to Match TheSocialSecurity Normal
RetirementAge.
percent retiring, by age
percentpercentpercent
fromfull—from all workingwoLkiugUuily
age time work work full—time part-time retired
60 8.3 6.4 75.0 6.4 18.6
61 6.9 6.1 68.2 7.2 24.6
62 9.6 8.4 58.6 8.4 33.0
63 9.0 8.4 49.6 9.1 41.3
64 9.3 9.0 40.2 9.4 50.4
65 6.5 7.1 33.7 8.8 57.5
66 7.9 8.1 25.8 8.5 65.7
67 7.2 7.3 18.6 8.4 73.0
68 5.6 6.3 13.0 7.7 79.3
69 4.0 4.9 9.1 6.7 84.2
70 3.5 4.3 5.6 5.9 88.5
average age 62.6 63.7Table 8.7
Simulation of 1983 Social Security Rules Modified So That an








60 8.1 6.2 75.5
61 6.8 6.1 68.7 7.1 24.2
62 9.0 8.0 59.8 8.1 32.1
63 9.2 8.5 50.5 8.8 40.7
64 9.5 9.1 41.0 9.2 49.8
65 10.4 9.4 30.6 10.3 59.1
66 7.8 8.2 22.9 9.9 67.2
67 4.3 5.5 18.5 8.7 72.8
68 5.6 6.3 13.0 7.9 79.1
69 4.0 5.0 9.0 7.0 84.0
average age 62.6 63.7